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MAY, 1931

NUMBER 2.

FEDERAL COURT JUDGMENT LIENS
TERRITORIAL EXTENT

Apparently, at the present time, the thought of lawyers on the
law relating to the territorial extent of Federal Court judgment
liens on real property in the states, is somewhat confused. To attribute the bewilderment to any inherent difficulty in the subject would
be ungracious if not unjust. It would be fairer to ascribe it to the
distractions of modern life and business, though doubtless some
modicum of blame is due to that propensity so gloomily pondered
by Sir Joshua Reynolds when he said, "There is no expedient to
winch man will not resort to avoid the labor of thinking."
The subject is not without difficulties. The law governing such
Hens in a given state is the result of the reciprocal operation of the
laws of two sovereignties, the United States and the state. Whenever the law on any subject is so derived, it is apt to be a little intricate and search for it uninviting, requiring more time and closer
study than the busy practitioner or judge ordinarily can devote
to it.
There is a proneness on the part of lawyers to accept dicta, both
judicial and obiter, as pronouncements of law-a thing very easy
to do. Of necessity we go to the books to learn what the law is.
We like and seek to find it ready-made, clean-cut and finished. We
should like, also, to find it supporting our side of a controversy or
at least conforming to a preconceived notion of what the law ought
to be. A dictum meeting these requirements is entertained with
favor and is easy to accept as law
Judicial dicta, of course, are entitled to some consideration,
obiter dicta, none. In a few cases on federal court judgment liens
there are dicta of both kinds, winch are confusing and misleading
unless recognized for what they are. The most outstanding example
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is the much discussed case of Rhea v. Smith.' The unfortunate opinion in this case is the latest and most potent cause of perplexity
The decision of the case is right, but the opinon not only states
erroneously the main question to be solved, but upon the discussion
of that question reaches a wrong conclusion as the basis of the
decision, disclosing only indirectly and obscurely the true reason.
For an opinion in a case requiring no consideration of policy nor
the exercise of discretion, but only the application of logic almost
mathematical in its precision, this opinion is discouragingly inexact
and vague.
The almost oracular quality attributed by the bar to whatever
is said by judges makes it difficult to confute their statements on
matters of law, especially those emanating in the form of reasoned
opinions from the highest court in the land. But this is not a sufficient reason for withholding criticism of an erroneous dictum or
even of an erroneous decision. Protest against the dictum in Rhea
v. Smith is the more insistently called for because it is now leading
hundreds of persons to waste hours daily in searching records that
do not need to be searched and in abstracting records that did not
need to be made, and is causing suitors in some places to do things
unnecessary and in other places to omit steps necessary to the assertion and preservation of their rights under the law It is proposed
to attempt in this paper a close examination of the case, but before
coming to that, to trace briefly the origin and development of the
judgment lien, and then to analyze the pertinent parts of the
statute that was misconstrued in the opinion, namely, the Act of
Congress of August 1, 1888.2
At common law, unmodified by statute, a debtor's lands could
not be subjected to the payment of his debts (except in favor of
the king), and hence a judgment was not a lien. But in the year
1285, at the instance of merchants, who not infrequently had judgments against impecunious land owners, the statute of Westminster
II (13 Edw I, c. 18) was enacted, which allowed a very limited
kind of execution against land. The writ was called the writ of
elegit (he has elected)
By taking it out the creditor elected
to collect his debt in a certain way, thereby waiving his right, tem274 U. S. 434, 71 L. ed. 1139, 47 Sup. Ct. 698 (1927), reversing 308 Mo.
422, 272 S. W 964 (1925) To set out here the facts, issues, decision and
dictum in this case would be to duplicate much that will follow in this
paper. Moreover, anything like an adequate statement would be much too
long to insert here. Readers not already familiar with the case may turn
to one of the reports of it if they desire, but the "historical approach" presently to be essayed is the easier one and much more interesting.
25 U. S. Stat. 357 U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, Sections 812, 813 (1888).
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porarily at least, to resort to other means (having the debtor thrown
into jail, for example) Under this writ the sheriff seized the chattels of the debtor (except oxen and beast of the plow) and delivered
them to the creditor at an appraised value.5
If the value of the seized chattels did not satisfy the judgment,
or if there were no chattels, the sheriff put the creditor into possession of a moiety by partition of the debtor's land. The creditor became a tenant by elegit, entitled to hold the land until the rents,
issues and profits discharged the debt.
Now, though this statute said nothing about a lien, the courts
held that when a writ of elegit was delivered to the sheriff for
execution, there arose a lien upon the land to the extent necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the writ. (This is sometimes called an
execution lien.) When it is considered that a judgment lien is not
an interest in the land itself (jus sn re) but only a right to resort
to it to the exclusion of others, and that no question would arise
about even the existence of such a right unless there were conflicting claims, it is readily seen that the creation of the lien by judicial
construction was practically a necessity For suppose that one
of several judgment creditors took out a writ of elegit and delivered
it to the sheriff, and that thereafter but before the land was seized
another creditor did likewise, and then another and so on. Which
creditor ought to have the best right 9 The one who acted first, of
course, who did all that he himself could do to subject the debtor's
land to the payment of his judgment. Here, then, was an established right to proceed against the land-a charge upon it, and
that is what a lien is.
Gradually it came about. by usage, that a judgment creditor need
not, in order to have.a lien, actually put a writ into the hands of
the sheriff for execution or even have one issued, but could simply
enter on the roll his election to look to the debtor's land. Here was
the germ of the judgment lien (as distinguished from the execution
lien), which slowly developed through usage and judicial decisions
and legislation, variously in different colomes and states, into the
lien as it is known today It was but a step from the lien under
the elegit to the lien on all the debtor's land in fee when the free3To some it has seeemed a mystery that this statute allowed the seizure

of the plow, but not the beasts; for it would seem that a landowner would
be almost as hopelessly crippled without the plow as without the beasts;
but while the ways of legislative bodies have always been, and of necessity
always will be, to some extent inexplicable, inscrutable, yet there is, in this
instance, a fairly obvious reason: a plow does not eat, a beast does; which
is a good or a bad reason according to one's viewpoint.
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hold in all was subjected to execution, and thence but another step
to legislative recognition of the lien, and thence another to express
statutory fiat. The assertion sometimes made in late years that the
modern judgment lien is supported only by statute, is not quite
true.
Early in the life of the federal courts their judgments were held
to be liens whether similar state court judgments were liens by the
laws of the state in which the Federal Court judgments were rendered. This resulted from the "Process Acts" of Congress (1789,
1792, 1828, 1872) and other acts, adopting for the Federal Courts
4
the processes of the several states in which the courts were held.
Though suggestions are found that the judgment lien may be considered a rule of property applicable by the Federal Courts to
their own judgments under the 34th section of the Judiciary Act
of 17 8 9 ,1 this is not the generally accepted derivation of the lien.
While undoubtedly Congress has power to make Federal Court
judgments liens upon land independently of state laws, it has
never done so, but, pursuant to its uniform policy in matters of
practice and procedure in actions at law, has adopted the laws of
the states on the subject, so far as they were suitable to the orgamzation and powers of the Federal Courts. Such adoption did not
In Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. ed. 134 (1868), it was said:
"Judgments were not liens at common law, but several of the
states had passed laws to that effect before the judicial system of
the United States was organized, and the decisions of this court
have established the doctrine that 'Congress, in adopting the processes of the states, also adopted the modes of process prevailing at
that time in the courts of the several states in respect to the lien of
judgments within the limits of their respective jurisdictions. Wi7liams v. Benedict, 8 How 111, Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black, 438
(67 U. S. XVII, 324) Bayard v. Lombard, 9 How. 530; Riggs v.
Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166 (73 U. S. XVIII, 768)
"Different regulations, however, prevailed in different states,
and in some neither a judgment nor a decree for the payipent of
money except in cases of attachment or mesne process, created any
preference in favor of the creditor until the execution was issued
and had been levied on the land. Where the lien is recognized, it
confers a right to levy on the land to the exclusion of other adverse
interests acquired subsequently to the judgment; but the lien constitutes no property or right in the land itself. Conard v. Atlantic
Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 413. Masssngill v. Downs, 7 How 767."
The early reported cases are reviewed, with some reference to unreported decisions, in an auditor's report in the case of Bayard v. Lombard.
9 How 530, 13 L. ed. 245 (1850) which is set out in full because "it examines a point of great interest to the profession throughout the United
States."
A note in 47 L. R. A. 469 cites practically all cases up to 1899. In
"Notes to Decisions" under Section 812, Tit. 28, U. S. C. A., all other pertinent cases to date may be found.
I U. S. Stat. 92, R. S. 721, U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, Sec. 725.
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have the effect of conferring upon the states any power whatever
to legislate about Federal Court judgment liens, to control or regulate them in any way, it simply gave to state laws, so far as they
were suitable and adaptable, the force of federal law. All questions concerning such liens--their existence, duration, effect, territorial extent and other incidents-were federal questions ultimately
determinable by the Federal Courts.
A doubt having arisen whether in the adoption of state processes
the state laws relating to the duration of judgment liens were embraced, Congress passed, on July 4, 1840, what became Sec. 967
R. S., U. S. C. A. Tit. 28, Sec. 814, reading as follows.
"Judgments and decrees rendered in a District Court,
within any state, shall cease to be liens on real estate or
chattels real, in the same manner and at like periods as
judgments and decrees of the courts of such state cease,
by law, to be liens thereon."
This was the first act of Congress expressly mentioning liens of
judgments in the Federal Courts, although there had been tacit
recognition of such liens in the Act of May 19, 1828," relating
to stay of execution.
There remained one troublesome difference between the liens of
State Court judgments and those of Federal Court judgments,
namely, the difference in territorial extent.
In states where judgments were liens at all (which was in the
most of them), the lien usually was restricted territorially to the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment,
ordinarily a county No such restriction applied to. Federal Court
judgments, but such a judgment was a lien throughout the state
in which the court was held, even though there were two or more
Federal Court districts in the state. That the lien should extend
throughout the federal district was easy enough to arrive at, for
state law having in view counties as'jurisdictional units of territory would necessarily, when adapted to the federal judicial system, have to be regarded as contemplating districts as jurisdictional units. State law adopted by Congress for application to
federal subjects becomes federal law, and in its minor parts must
be modified to suit the new subject in a rational way
But the holding that in a state where there were two or more
federal districts a judgment in one of them operated as a lien not
04 U. S. Stat. 281, c. 68, Sec. 2, R. S. 988, U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, Sec. 841.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
only there but everywhere else in the state, was not so easily reached.
Under R. S. Sec. 985, derived from the Act of May 20, 1826, c.
124,1 "All writs of execution upon judgments or decrees obtained
in a District Court, in any state which is divided into two or more
districts, may run and be executed in any part of such state, but
shall be issued from, and made returnable to, the court wherein the
judgment was obtained." Hence, state processes on a judgment,
adopted as the processess of a Federal Court, became, by adaptation, state-wide instead of district-wide. And therefore, since it
was because of the creditor's right to final process that his judgment became a lien at all or to any extent, it necessarily followed
that the lien was state-wide. Only two cases have been found on
'
and Prevost v. Gorthis point The Manhattan Co. v. Evertson,"
9
has been found
no
case
rell; but they are soundly reasoned and
10
of
the judgment
that contradicts them. Assertions that the lien
in
cases where
made
is co-extensive with the district have all been
the properties sought to be charged were within the districts but
not within the counties where the judgments were rendered. Congress, in the Act of August 1, 1888,11 tacitly recognized the rule
that a Federal Court judgment, at that date and prior, was a lien
throughout the state, whether the state constituted one or two or
more federal court districts. Some rather grotesque questions would
arise if that recognition were not implicit in the act.
In many, if not all of the states where judgments were liens upon
land but only, in the first instance, within the county where rendered, there came to be enacted statutes providing for the extension
of the lien to any other county in the state by some filing, registering, recording, docketing, indexing or the like of a transcript or
abstract of the judgment or of the journal or docket entry thereof,
in some county office such as that of the clerk of a court or the
Such statutes,
recorder of instruments affecting real property
before the Act of August 1, 1888, were not adopted by Congress or
by Federal Courts under authority of Congress so as to be applicable to Federal Court judgments. The most of them, moreover, did
not mention or by terms include Federal Court judgments and
hence imposed upon local state officers no duty to perform as to
such judgments the services required as to judgments of the State
Courts. The few of them that did purport to affect Federal Court
14 U. S. Stat. 184, U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, Sec. 838.
8 6 Paige 457, 466 (1837).
'5 W N. C. 151, Fed. Cas. No. 11, 400 (1877)
10See 14 Cent. L. J. 304.

"Note 2, s-upra.
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judgments were inoperative in that respect because they were not
adopted as federal law and the states were utterly without power to
control the effect or operation of judgments of the Federal Courts.
Congress did not have power, and has never attempted, to authorize or require state officers to perform any service in respect of
judgments of the Federal Courts. To confer power or impose
duties upon state officers is exclusively a state function, the exercise of which, however, in respect of anything to be done about
Federal Court judgments, was unavailing until Congress, by reciprocal legislation, had authorized the employment of the services to
the effect intended. If, therefore, prior to August 1, 1888, in a
state whose statutes authorized the transcripting of Federal Court
judgments, a state officer had performed the required service in
respect of such a judgment, his act would have been as nothing,
wholly ineffective in law, for it was not federaZ law that the thing
done should have any effect.
The rule, then, that judgments of the Federal Courts operated as
liens throughout the states where the courts respectively were held,
continued to be applied notwithstanding. state statutes regulating
the territorial operation of State Court judgments as liens. The
consequent unsatisfactory situation was well described by Judge
Caldwell in Dartmouth,Savsngs Bank v. Bates,,' 2 in these words.
"This rule resulted in giving suitors in the Federal
Courts a preference over those in the State Courts as to
the territorial extent of the lien, and worked a hardship
on the citizens generally The mass of the people relied
confidently on the records in the clerk's office of their
county disclosing all judgments that were liens on property in the county Most people were ignorant of the allpervading lien of a judgment in a Federal Court, and they
bought and sold lands on the faith of what the county
records disclosed. The result was that cases of great hardship occurred. Persons who bought and paid for lands on
the faith that the records in the county clerk's office
showed the condition of the land with reference to judgment liens thereon, afterwards lost their lands by reason
of the liens of judgments in Federal Courts held in some
other county, and often at a distance of hundreds of miles
from the county in which the lands lay To correct these
hardships, and to put the suitors in the State and Federal
Courts on an equal footing in respect of the territorial
extent of the liens of judgments in the two jurisdictions,
44 Fed. 546, 549 (1890).
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in so far as Congress could do it, the Act of August 1,
1888 (25 U S. St. 357) was passed." 13
Section 1 of the Act of August 1, 1888, is the only part that need
now be studied. It reads as follows
"Judgments and decrees rendered in a District Court
of the United States within any state, shall be liens on
property throughout such state in the same manner and to
the same extent and under the same conditions only as if
such judgments and decrees had been rendered by a court
of general jurisdiction of such state Provided, That whenever the laws of any state require a judgment or decree of
state court to be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed,
or any other thing to be done, in a particular manner, or
in a certain office or county, or parish in the State of
Louisiana, before a lien shall attach, this act shall be applicable therein whenever and only whenever the laws of such
state shall authorize the judgments and decrees of the
United States courts to be registered, recorded, docketed,
indexed, or otherwise conformed to the rules and requirements relating to the judgments and decrees of the courts
of the state."
The enacting part of this section (down to the proviso) does not
say that Federal Court judgments shall be liens, but that they shall
be liens "only as tf" they were State Court judgments. Not two
assertions, but only one is made. Grammatically and logically there
13That the purpose of this act as thus stated by Judge Caldwell was
actually the purpose contemplated by Congress when the bill was under
consideration, is abundantly proved by the report of the house committee
on the judiciary and the ensuing debate in the house. (Cong. Record, V
19, pt. 3, 50th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2359 et seq.) The original bill (H. R.
8180) was introduced by the committee as a substitute for four similar
bills then pending before it (H. R. 1378, 1389, 1869 and 5626) During
the debate it appeared that other similar bills had been before the 48th
and 49th Congresses. So it is apparent that the matter was, and had been
for some time, deemed to be of considerable importance and some urgency
The bill was modified somewhat during the debate in the house, but as
finally passed there it was accepted by the supporters of the bill as effecting the result intended by the committee's bill. Further amendments were
made in the senate at the instance of its committee on the judiciary without debate of any importance. The house concurred only after conference.
One senate amendment was the insertion in the first section of the words
"throughout such state," and another was the insertion of the word "only"
after the word "conditions." It is reasonable to believe, therefore, that the
effect of these words upon the meaning of the act received especial consid-

eration.

Nowhere in the congressional proceedings or debates was there any
intimation that states were to be authorized to regulate the operation of
Federal Court judgments as liens or to "conform" any such regulations to
those applicable to State Court judgments. The only "conforming" mentioned was that which would be effected by the very bill itself if enacted.
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is one sentence, not two, and that one is stmple, not compound. The
"only as
single assertion is that judgments "shall be liens."
if," etc. Not the creation of liens but the imposition of restrictions
and conditions upon liens is the effect of this single assertion. It
already was law that Federal Court judgments unconditionally and
unrestrictedly were liens throughout a state whose own court judgments were liens in any manner or to any extent or under any condition at all. That would be law if this act had not been passed or
should now be repealed, and is law now in those states where by
reason of the proviso the act does not apply That such was and
is the law is tacitly but very plainly recognized not only by the
enacting clause but by the section as a whole. Congress simply
took the law as it was and imposed state restrictions and conditions
upon it save in those states that should not see fit to make it possible to impose them.
The proviso withholds application of the act in any state where
it would not be possible to apply the local rules. The condition
under which the proviso applies at all is that there exist state laws
requiring "a judgment or decree of a state court to be registered,
recorded, docketed, indexed, or any other thing to be done, in a
particular manner, or in a certain office or county
before lien
shall attach." If such laws exist, the proviso applies, and the condition that must then exist to let the act apply is that the state shall
"authorize the judgments and decrees of the United States courts to
be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed," or otherwise dealt with
as the state laws require for State Court judgments. In other
words, where the proviso applies there must be found, in order that
the act may conform the treatment of Federal Court judgments to
that required for State Court judgments, adequate authority in
local state officers to perform for Federal Court judgments the
requisite clerical services.
This act confers upon the states no power whatever to enact anything regulating Federal Court judgments, nor does it purport to
do so. No such intent is expressed, and any possible vague implication to that effect in the last clause of the proviso, if not rebutted
by the fact that Congress could not constitutionally delegate any
such power, is nullified by a consideration of what was sought to
be accomplished. Congress could not completely conform federal
regulations to state regulations unless local state officers were
vested with authority (implying, of course, the correlative duty)
to perform as to Federal Court judgments the same services required of them as to court judgments. The states could grant this
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authority, Congress could not. The states could have granted it
without any action by Congress, but the services performed would
have been futile without reciprocal action by Congress giving them
some effect. The Act of August 1, 1888, is simply that reciprocal
action. 4
In some states requiring the transcripting of State Court judgments, the statutes name Federal Courts along with State Courts
whose judgments are affected, and in others there are separate
statutes or sections of the same nature purporting to prescribe regulations for Federal Court judgments only Such arrogation of
power began, as noticed above, before the passage of the Act of
August 1, 1888, the result probably of a laudable but ill-advised and
mis-directed effort to bring about conformity as betweenFederal and
State Court judgment liens. These deceptive examples were, apparently, just blindly followed, after the passage of that act, without
adequate study of the subject. Such provisions are wholly inoperative upon Federal Court judgments and are to be entirely ignored,
" Judge Caldwell, in Dartmouth Savings Bank v. Bates, note 12, supra,
explains the situation thus:

"But the power of Congress was not adequate to the task of
extending the territorial operation of a judgment lien in the mode
provided by state laws for a judgment in the State Court. Congress was confronted with the difficulty pointed out by Mr. Justice
McLean,-the law of a state might provide for filing and docketing
a transcript of a judgment of a State Court in the clerk's office of
any county in the state, and in this way extend the lien of a judgment beyond the county in which it was rendered. But there was
no federal clerk's office, or other like office, in each county in the
state in which a judgment rendered in a Federal Court could be
docketed, and Congress could not make it obligatory on the state
clerks to docket and enter a judgment of a Federal Court on
their records. But it was entirely competent for the state to require her clerks to perform this service, and the proviso in Section
1 of the act declares, in legal effect, that when the laws of a state
provide for docketing in her clerk's offices, or other offices, the
judgments of Federal Courts, in the same manner that judgments
in her own courts may be docketed, then, and not before, the territorial extent (in other respects they were already the same)
of the lien of a judgment in a Federal Court in that state shall be
the same as that of a judgment in the State Court."
Judge Caldwell had already quoted Justice McLean as follows:
"The law of the state, which extends the lien of a judgment of
a Circuit Court of the state to any county within which the record
of such judgment shall be recorded, can have no application to this
court. We have no right under it to require our judgments to be
recorded by any clerk of the State Court.
If it shall be deemed
important to have the records of the judgments of this court recorded in the county where the lands of the defendant are situated, it may be required by act of Congress, or by a rule of this
court, if the law of the state shall require the clerks to make such
record." Den v. Jones, 2 McLean 83, 85.
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except sn so far only as they may smpliedly confer authority upon
local state officials to perform the services necessary to effect the
transcripting of Federal Court judgments. Usually, however, it is
not necessary to find the authority thus indirectly conferred, for
in most such cases the statutes elsewhere expressly grant the authority or impose the duty, or at least imply it more directly 11 The
legislatures of only four or five of the thirty-four states that have
enacted anything concerning Federal Court judgment liens have
exercised the degree of restraint that ought to characterize the attitude of one sovereignty toward the instrumentalities of another, by
confining themselves simply to authorizing their local officers, m
effect, to treat Federal Court judgments just as they would State
Court judgments."0
" For example, in the State of Washington, in Chapter 60, Laws of 1929,
Federal District Courts are mentioned in Sections 1 and 2, where regulations are prescribed for both State and Federal Court judgment liens.
From these provisions, which contemplate the filing with county clerks
(who are ex-officio clerks of the Superior Court for their respective counties) of abstracts of judgments of the Federal Courts, there might, and if
expedient and necessary would, be deduced an implied grant of authority
to accept such abstracts for filing and otherwise treat them as if they came
from State Courts. But this is not necessary, because Section 4 more
directly implies a grant of authority to accept such abstracts for filing
and expressly imposes the duty to docket'and index them, thus: "It shall
be the duty of the country clerk to enter in hss execution docket
any
duly certified abstract of any judgment of any court mentioned in this act,
filed in his office, and to sndex the same in the same manner as judgments
originally rendered in the Superior Court for the county of which he is
clerk." (Italics supplied.) Federal Courts being mentioned in the act, the
duty thus imposed upon clerks extends to their judgments.
Since county clerks are thus charged with the duty to accept, docket and
index abstracts of judgments of the Federal Courts for the state, just as
if the judgments were rendered by the Superior Courts of the state, the
Act of Congress of August 1, 1888, is applicable in the State of Washington;
and a Federal Court judgment rendered in the state becomes, at the
moment of its entry, a lien on land in the county in which it was rendered,
but not in any other county without the filing of an abstract of the judgment with the county clerk of the other county.
S' Some of these enactments are so simple, and yet so adequate, that
they merit attention as models:
Illinois, Sec. 81, Ch. 77, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill's 1925) "Judgments and
decrees of courts of the United States held within this state, and all writs,
returns, certificates of the levy of a writ, and records of said courts, may
be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise dealt with in the
public offices of this state, so as to make them conform to the rules and
requirements relating to judgments and decrees of courts of this state."
Maryland: Sec. 28, Art. 17, Ann. Code of Maryland (Bagby 1924) directs
the several court clerks to "register, record, docket and index all judgments
and decrees of the courts of the United States in the same manner and at
like charges as judgments and decrees of the state courts are by them
registered, recorded, docketed and indexed."
Texas: Art. 5451, Vernon's Ann. Texas Civ. Stat. 1925: "An abstract of
a judgment rendered in this state by any United States court may be recorded and indexed in the same manner and with like force and effect as
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Missouri, where Rhea v. Smith arose, had made judgments extensible by transcripting, and was one of those states that had presumed to give specific statutory directions as to how and when and
to what extent Federal Court judgments should become liens on
land. This was attempted by naming United States Courts along
with the State Supreme Court and the two courts of appeals, in two
sections of the statutes applicable only to them (1554 and 1583) "8
One section (1554) declared that judgments of these Appellate
Courts and of Federal Courts should be liens "upon the filing of
a transcript thereof in the office of the clerk of any Circuit Court,"
upon the debtors' lands in the county in which the filing was done.
(Circuit Courts were the state's first instance courts of general jur
isdiction, and there was a clerk's office in each county ) The other
section (1583) enacted "That judgments or decrees of the Supreme
Court or either Court of Appeals or of any United States Court
shall, as soon as they are filed in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court
., be entered in the said docket." (The keeping of
an alphabetical judgment docket by each clerk was provided for
in the three preceding sections.) Thus undoubtedly the Circuit
Court clerks had authority and were charged with the duty to receive and docket transcripts of judgments of the Federal Courts,
which met precisely and completely the condition upon which the
Act of Congress of August 1, 1888, should apply in the state,
namely, that "the laws of such state shall authorize the judgments
"
docketed
and decrees of the United States Courts to be
(last clause of Section 1)
The courts of record of Missouri (ignoring criminal and mumicipal courts) were the Supreme Court, the two Courts of Appeal
(intermediate), the Circuit Courts, the County Courts, and the
Probate Courts, any of which might render pecuniary judgments or
decrees, though the Circuit Courts were the only courts of first instance of general jurisdiction. Judgments of the Appellate Courts
provided for judgments of the courts of this state, upon the certificates of
the clerks of such United States courts."
Wisconsn: Sec. 270, 81, Wis. Stat. (1925)
"The several clerks of the
Circuit Courts shall docket and index the judgments and decrees of the
courts of the United States in the same manner as the judgments of the
courts of this state may be docketed and indexed, but in separate volumes,
upon the receipt of copies of such judgments and decrees, duly certified by
the clerk of the court in which they were rendered, and upon payment of
fees allowed by law for like services."
"Note 1, supra.
" Secs. 1554 to 1556, 1580 to 1583, 1593, 2850 and 2851, Mo. R. S. 1919,
contained all the statute law of Missouri relating to judgment liens at the
time of that case.
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became liens only upon transcripting, 19 as did also judgments of
justices courts. 20 A judgment of any other court of record (i. e.,
Circuit, County and Probate) became a lien from the time of rendition, upon lands in the county where rendered, without any transcripting or the doing of any other thing.21 To make such a judgment a lien in any other county a transcript had to be filed with
the clerk of the Circuit Court of that county 22
The facts in Rhea v. Smith, were such that, if a certain judgment
in Rhea's favor against Smith's grantor, rendered January 10,
1921, by the District Court of the United States for the Southern
Division of the Western District of Missouri at Joplin in Jasper
County, was a lien on the debtor's land in that same county from
the date of rendition, without the filing of a transcript of the judgment with the clerk of the Circuit Court of the county, then Rhea
was entitled to recover, otherwise he was not. The case was brought
in the Circuit Court of Jasper County, where judgment was for the
defendant, Smith. On appeal this judgment was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Missouri, en bane,23 Judges Blair and Atwood
dissenting. On appeal thence to the United States Supreme Court,
the judgment was reversed without dissent. 24 Chief Justice Taft
wrote the opimon.
That this deciston was correct is perfectly plain. The Act of
August 1, 1888, was applicable in Missouri because by state law
the Circuit Court clerks were authorized and obliged to receive and
docket Federal Court judgments just as if they were State Court
judgments. The act being applicable, it imposed upon Federal
Court judgments, not the limitations Missouri attempted to impose
upon them, but the rules she prescribed for the operation of judgments of her own courts. That is what Section 1 of the act says
and all that it says "Judgments
rendered in a
court of the
United States within any state, shall be liens
only as if such judgments
had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction of
such state." If Rhea's judgment had been rendered by the State
Circuit Court m Jasper County, what more would the state law have
required him to do to make it a lien on the debtor's land in that
same countyQ Nothing. Hence his judgment rendered by the
Federal Court in Jasper County became a lien on that land upon
Sec. 1554, Mo. R. S. 1919.
Secs. 2850 and 2851, Mo. R. S. 1919.
Secs. 1555 and 1556, Mo. R. S. 1919.
"Sec. 1593, Mo. R. S. 1919.
2fRhea v. Smith, 308 Mo. 422, 272 S. W 964 (1925).
'Rhea'v. Svtith, 274 U. S. 434, 47 Sup. Ct. 698, 71 L. ed. 1139 (1927).
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rendition, without the doing of anything else. By force of the act
of Congress the same state law that would have been applied to a
Circuit Court judgment was applicable to the Federal Court judgment.
In the opinion delivered in the United States Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Taft put the following as the main question in the
case "It turns on the question whether the law of Missouri provtding for the registration, recording, docketing, and indexing of
judgments of the United States court for the purpose of making
them liens upon land in that state, conforms to the provisions of the
state law upon the same subject in reference to liens of judgments
of the courts of record of the state." (Italics supplied.) The meaning here of the italicized words, "providing for the registration,
etc.," is not their literal meaning, which would render the whole
question quite pointless, but it is the meaning indicated well along
in the opinion where it is said that Congress, by the first section
of the Act of August 1, 1888, intended to limit the then existing
rule, "but intended to do this only in those states which passed
laws making the conditions of creation, scope and territorialapplication of the liens of Federal Court judgments the same as State
Court judgments." (Italics supplied.) So that, to paraphrase the
statement of the question in skeletal form, the Chief Justice's meaning was this 'The case turns on the question whether the law of
Missouri governing Federal Court judgment liens conforms to the
state law governing the liens of State Court judgments.'
The question necessarily assumes that a state has power to regulate Federal Court judgment liens. But this power, by the last
clause of Section 8 of Article I of the Federal Constitution, is vested
in Congress, 25 and it is a cardinal principle of our constitutional
law that a legislative body cannot delegate power to make laws.
Furthermore, as has already been said, Congress has not delegated
to the states any power over liens of Federal Court judgments. By
Section 6, c. 255, Act of June 1, 187226 Congress adopted state
process laws then in effect and empowered the Federal Courts to
adopt such as might be enacted thereafter, and by the Act of August 1, 1888, Congress adopted conditionally state laws regulating
liens of judgments of their own courts, but it has never attempted
Wayman v. Southard (Ky. 1825) 10 Wheat. 22, 6 L. ed. 253; Abeman
v. Booth (Wis. 1859) 21 How 521, 16 L. ed. 169.
2117 Stat. 197, R. S. Sec. 916, U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, Sec. 727.
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to delegate to the states power to make laws governing liens of Federal Court judgments.
The stated question implies that a state, in attempting to govern
the liens of Federal Court judgments, must do so exactly according
to a certain definite pattern, namely, the one according to which
the state governs the liens of judgments of its own courts. Why
should it be thought necessary or desirable that a state enact a new
set of regulations as to federal judgments just like the set it already
has for its own judgments 9 Why not simply apply the latter to
federal judgments? The answer is obvious, that that is just what
is done by the enacting of the first section of the act of Congress
of August 1, 1888, whenever the application is possible, 1. e., whenever the requisite state clerical machinery is made available to Federal Court suitors. The states have not been required or authorized
or requested or even invited to effect any conformity They have
simply been offered the opportunity of making it possible for the
act of Congress to effect conformity
The fallacies inhering in the chief justice's conception of the
dominant question in the case permeate his entire discussion and
the resulting answer to the question, which is expressed in these
words.
"We think that the three sections, 1555, 1556 and 1554,
do not secure the needed conformity in the creation, extent
and operation of the resulting liens upon land as between
Federal and State Court judgments."
From this, without noticing at all Section 1583 requiring Circuit Court clerks to docket transcripts of Federal Court judgments,
and ignoring the lack of express negation in Section 1554, the
opinion then expresses this conclusion.
"The lien of Federal Court judgments in Missouri
therefore attaches to all lands of the judgment debtor lying
in the counties within the respective jurisdictions of the
two Federal District Courts in that state."
The land in controversy being situate in the county in which the
judgment was rendered, this conclusion went far beyond the necessity of the case. The precise ultimate question before the court was,
Did the federal judgment rendered in Jasper County become a lien
upon the debtor's land in that county without the filing of a
transcript of the judgment with the clerk of the Circuit Court of
the county? The decision was that it did, and the judgment of the
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Supreme Court of Missouri was reversed.

But to reach this deci-

sion did not require the holding that the judgment, upon rendition
27
and without transcripting, became a lien throughout the district.
The briefs of counsel show that neither party contended or suggested that the Act of Congress did not apply in Missouri. The
respondent would not, of course, because he was denying the lien.
The petitioner did not because his counsel recognized the law to be
as wrangled for in this paper. Mr. Hackney, in his brief for the
petitioner, stated his first point in these words
"Under the Missouri statute, if the judgment in question had
been rendered by the State Circuit Court of Jasper
County, it would have been a lien on the real estate in
controversy from date of rendition. Therefore, under
Section 1 of the Act of Congress relating to judgment
liens, the judgment of the Federal Court of Joplin was a
lien on such real estate from the date of its rendition."
His second point was stated as follows
"The Missouri legislature, while investing judgments
of the State Circuit Court of Jasper County with liens on
real estate in that county from date of rendition, had no
power by the passage of Section 1554, R. S. No. 1919, to
deprive the judgment of the Federal District Court at Joplin of any lien until a transcript thereof was filed with the
clerk of the State Circuit Court."
(His third and only other point related to the effect of the
repeal of Sec. 3 of the Act of August 1, 1888, which will be
noticed later.)
It is plain, therefore, that since the court, so far as appears from
the record, did not have presented to it or consider any arguments
for or against the "non-conformity theory" adopted in the opinion,
and since the only question before the court was whether the judgment without transcripting became a lien in the county where rendered, and the decision was that it did become a lien, the opinion
is authority on that question but pure obiter dictum on all else except the two subordinate points now about to be mentioned.
Mr. Robertson, in his brief for the respondent, argued that con"' The territorial extent of the lien, if the Act of August 1, 1888, were
not applicable would be state-wide, as was observed above, not merely
district-wide. It was not necessary however, in order to decide that there
was a lien in the county to hold that the act was not applicable.
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formity as between Federal Court judgments and State Appellate
Court judgments (as contemplated by Sections 1554 and 1583 of
the state statutes) would "more nearly meet the intention of Congress and the underlying purpose thereof" than would conformity
as between Federal Court judgments and those of State Circuit
Courts. But the court rejected the argument, saying
"It is obvious, however, that the District Court of the
United States is a court of first instance of general jurisdiction just as the Circuit Courts of the various counties
in Missouri are courts of general jurisdiction of first instance. The conformity required should obtain as between
them and not as between the Federal Court and the State
Appellate Courts."
Omitting the word "required," which reflects the all-pervading
erroneous notion that conformity is something to be created by
state legislation, this is a good statement of the law as it has always
been and is now whether the Act of Congress be applicable or not.
Mir. Robertson did not urge, unless by verbally adopting the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri, that any significance was to be attributed to the repeal of Section 3 of the Act
of August 1, 1888. ir. Hackney, in his brief for the petitioner, met
the argument on this point made in the majority opimon of that
28
court, and was sustained by the United States Supreme Court.

Judge Blair, in the dissenting opinion in the Missouri Supreme Court.
Judge Atwood concurring, has written the clearest brief discussion to be
found on this point, and it ought to be set out in full, with the reminder
that upon the repeal of Section 3 the remaining parts of the act were thereafter to be construed as if Section 3 had never been there, unless a different
legislative intent is apparent.
"Respondent argues and the majority of my brethren seem to
hold that the repeal by Congress in 1916 (39 Statutes at Large, 531)
ot Section 3 of Act of August 1, 1888, as amended in 1895, shows
that it was the intention of Congress to make a Federal Court judgment a lien upon real estate in the county where the same was
rendered only upon the filing of a transcript therein. Section 3,
as enacted, reads as follows:
"'Nothing herein shall be construed to require the docketing of
a judgment or decree of a United States court or the filing of a
transcript thereof, in any state office within the same county,
or parish in the State of Louisiana, in which the judgment or decree is rendered in order that such judgment or decree may be a
lien on any property within such county.
"In 1895 the following words were added thereto:
"'If the clerk of the United States Court be required by law to
have a permanent office and a judgment record open at all times
for public inspection in such county or parish. (28 Statutes at
Large 814.)
"The fact of such repeal furnishes respondent with a very plaus-
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From all that Chief Justice Taft said of Re Jackson Light &
Traction Co.,29 it would seem that the decision in that case was
right, but closer examination of the statutes of Mississippi 0 than
evidently he made, discloses that in effect the provisions were the
same as those in Missouri so far as regards either the doctrine of
Rhea v. Smith or the correct theory What is called "judgment
docket" in the latter state is "judgment roll" in the former. To
extend the lien a transcript is used in Missouri, an abstract, in ississippi. A clerk of a Circuit Court in Mississippi is required to
enter upon the judgment roll, as a matter of course, all judgments
rendered in his court. He is allowed a certain period of time in
which to do this, but when a judgment is entered it becomes a lien
within the county where rendered and the lien is related back to the
date of the rendition of the judgment, overreaching all intervening
rights. The Circuit Court is the state court of first instance of
general jurisdiction. Its clerks are authorized to file and enter on
the judgment roll abstracts of judgments of the Federal Courts.
In these circumstances a Federal Court judgment becomes a lien in
the county of rendition without the doing of anything more, by
virtue of the enacting clause of the first section of the Federal
Act of August 1, 1888, and in spite of the declaration of the Missisible argument that Section 1 did not originally and does not now
make a Federal Court judgment a lien in the county where ren-

dered unless a transcript thereof is filed in such county Here I regard the argument as unsound. We are not advised of the reasons
presented to Congress which actuated it in enacting Section 3 in
the first place or in later repealing said section, after it had
been amended. The provision that a federal court judgment
should be a lien upon rendition in the county where such judgment was rendered without filing a transcript therein gave an
advantage to federal judgment creditors not possessed by judgment creditors in the courts of those states which require particular steps to be taken in addition to the mere rendition of a
judgment before it becomes a lien in the county where rendered,
and Section 3 tended to prevent the complete harmony and conformity aimed at in Section 1. A very good and completely satisfying reason for repealing Section 3 is found in the evident purpose of Congress to put federal judgments on exactly the same
footing as state judgments. The enactment of Section 3 failed to
accomplish this in all cases and its repeal did effectually accomplish such purpose in all cases and in every state. It is inconceivable to me, as it is contended in respondent's brief, that, by such
repeal, Congress intended that judgments of Federal Courts should
not become a lien in the county where rendered unless and until
a transcript thereof is filed in the circuit clerk's office, while the
State Court judgment becomes a lien therein without such procedure. Such a purpose would be in hopeless conflict with the
purpose expressed in section 1."
-269 Fed. 223 (1920)
3oSecs. 620 to 624, Hemingway's Ann. Code 1927.
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sippi statute that it shall not be a lien until abstracted to the judg-

ment roll in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of the
county (See. 624). Hence, either in tins view of the law or under
the "non-conformity theory" of Chief Justice Taft's opinion in
Rhea v. Smith, the decision in Re Jackson Light & Traction Co.,
ought to have been the other way 3 '
Even if the "non-conformity theory" were tenable, there was no
cogent reason, certainly no clear necessity, for applying it to the
statutes of Missouri, which nowhere declared that a Federal Court
judgment not transcripted should not become a lien in the county
where rendered. Section 1554 declared affirmatively that judgments of the Federal Courts and the State Appellate Courts should
be liens upon transcripting to any county, and Section 1583 simply
directed that transcripts from those courts be docketed as soon as
filed with clerks of Circuit Courts. If there is a negation in Section 1554, it is only by implication. Judge Blair, in the dissenting
opinion in the Missouri Supreme Court, found a very reasonable
interpretation of this section without resorting to any such implication.82
" Mr. F C. Hackman of the Seattle Bar pointed this out in a very
thorough paper entitled "Concerning Rhea v. Smith," published in Vol. 22
(N.S.), p. 35, Lawyer and Banker reasoning on the basis of the "non-conformity theory."
61"The majority opinion, as does respondent, lays much stress
upon Section 1554 of our statute, which provides that judgments
obtained in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and federal
trial courts shall be liens in any county in the state wherein a
tranqcript thereof shall be filed. Apparently this section is one
making provision for a lien broader in territorial application
than the lien attaching upon mere rendition of the judgment. It
apparently has no reference to the latter sort of lien.
"It required no action on the part of the Missouri legislature to
give a lien to a judgment of the Federal District Court. That is
the exclusive prerogative of Congress. Therefore, our legislature, in enacting Section 1554, undertook to do nothing more than
to put Federal Court judgments upon an equality with State Court
judgments by authorizing the filing of transcrips thereof in any
county of the state and providing for a lien therein upon such
filing."
Judge Blair, in the preceding paragraph, omitted reference to Section
1583. This apparently was an oversight, for elsewhere -n the opinion he
cited to this point Sections 1554 and 1583 together as enabling the transcripting of Federal Court judgments to the offices of State Circuit Court
clerks, saying:
"This state has enacted legislation enabling transcripts of
Federal Court judgments to be filed in the offices of the clerks of
the Circuit Courts of the counties of the state and thereupon to
become liens upon the real estate belonging to judgment debtors,
situate therein, m the same manner as judgments of courts of one
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The non-conformity idea did not have its origin in the opinion
of Chief Justice Taft in Rhea v. Smith. The germ of it is found,
of course, in the acts of state legislatures that presumed, some before and some after the Act of August 1, 1888, to enact regulations
governing the creation and operation of liens of Federal Court
judgments. The first judicial recognition of the idea seems to have
been given by Judge Van Fleet in Lsneker v Dillon.3 3 In this case
the property sought to be charged was in a county other than that
where the Federal Court judgment was rendered, and no transcripting had been done. A State Court judgment was not a lien in a
county other than that where rendered until a transcript of the
orignal docket entry had been filed with the recorder of the other
county The state statute that had been enacted to meet the condition requisite to the application of the Act of August 1, 1888,
prescribed, in rather loose and ambiguous language, a complicated
and cumbersome procedure for creating and extending liens of Federal Court judgments, but it failed to do the one simple essential
thing, namely, to impose upon county recorders the duty to file
transcripts of docket entres from the offices of clerks of the Federal Courts. The decision was that the Act of August 1, 1888, was
not applicable in California at that time. Obviously this was correct, but the "non-conformity theory" was not needed in order to
reach it.
The manner in which Judge Van Fleet developed the theory is
shown in the following quotation from his opinion (p. 473)
"It will be observed that under the terms of the proviso
the act is to have effect only in those states wherein the
state law has made provision by which the mode of casting
liens by judgments and decrees of the Federal Courts shall
be 'conformed to the rules and requirements relating to
the judgments and decrees of the courts of the state' in
other words, until the state shall have provided-which obviously Congress did not possess the power to do-for
docketing or filing abstracts of the judgments of Federal
Courts in the local state or county offices in the same mancounty may be transcripted to another county. (Secs. 1554 and
1583, R. S. 1919.)"
It is a singular thing that the one and only section of the Missouri
statute (Sec. 1583, Mo. R. S. 1919) that met forthright the simple condition requisite to the application of the federal act in Missouri, though it
was set out in full in Mr. Robertson's brief and was elsewhere therein
mentioned several times and was referred to by Judge Blair, completely
escaped the notice of the United States Supreme Court.
1275 Fed. 460, 472-475 (D.C. Cal. 1921)

FEDERAL JUDGMENT LIENS
ner as provided for judgments of State Courts, and gtvng
them like effect, thus putting them upon an equality with
the latter as a protection to suitors, the limitations of the
act should not apply, but a judgment or decree of a Federal Court should continue to cast a lien co-extensive with
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the court rendering it. And such has been the construction of the act."
In the italicized words lies the mischievous wrong idea, which
would shift from Congress to the state the power to effect the
desired conformity If "shall" be changed to "may" and the
other italicized words be deleted, the analysis of the proviso will
be fairly clear and accurate. (The extent of the lien, if the Act of
Congress should not apply, would be state-wide, however, instead
of only district-wide, but this point was not involved.) Quoting
from the last clause of the proviso, as Judge Van Fleet did, only
the words "conformed to the rules," etc., detached from the preceding context, may momentarily lend color to the thought of an
attempted delegation of power to the states to effect conformity,
but a moment's reflection will dispel the idea. The several states
had various kinds of procedure for creating or extending judgment
liens. Registering, recording, docketing, indexing, might not melude them all, so in the first clause of the proviso, the phrase "or
any other thing to be done" was added as a catch-all. The corresponding catch-all m the last clause is the phrase "or otherwise
conformed to the rules," etc. This is not the happiest construction
that could have been devised, perhaps, yet the meaning is perfectly clear when one remembers that the only possible obstacle a Federal Court judgment creditor might meet in attempting to conform
to the state law would be lack of authority in local state officials to
treat his judgment as if it were a State Court judgment.
While Judge Blair in the dissenting opinion in Rhea v. Smith in
the Missouri Supreme Court, referred to the "non-conformity
theory" expressed in LTneker v. Dillon,34 he did not adopt it, but
pointed out merely (in the next to the last paragraph of the opinion) that even if the theory were adopted and applied, the respondent's case would not be helped. The paragraph in Chief
Taft's opinion commencing "It is clear that Congress by the first
section of the Act of August 1, 1888," is almost a paraphrase of
the paragraph in Judge Blair's opinion beginning "It is apparent
from reading the first section of the Act of August 1, 1888;" but
there is this crucial difference whereas Judge Blair used the lan-

31Note 33,

supra.
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guage of the last clause of the proviso in that section in stating the
condition under which the act would apply, Chief Justice Taft used
the words "only in those states which passed laws making the conditons of creatwn, scope, and territorialapplication of the liens
of Federal Court judgments the same as State Court judgments."
5
This was the slip Judge Van Fleet made in Inneker v. Dillon."
Probably, at present, in every state where a judgment lien is
given at all there are provisions for registering, recording or the
like, to be done after the entry of the judgment in order to create
or extend the lien or both. In every such case it is enough to inquire whether local state officers have authority to do for Federal
Court judgments what the state law requires them to do for State
Court judgments in the creation or extenswn of the lien. If they
have not, then the act of Congress does not apply and a Federal
Court judgment becomes a state-wide lien upon rendition, but if
they have, then the act does apply and whatever else the state statutes may say about Federal Court judgments is to be ignored as
unauthorized and void, and such judgments are to be treated just
as if rendered by State Courts.
Apparently in Kentucky, Michigan and some of the New England states there is no such thing as a judgment lien proper, though
a lien attaches upon execution issued or upon levy This situation
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The only practical remedy for the confusion flowing from the
opinion in Rhea v. Smith is a new act of Congress to take the place
of the present one, not changing the law as it now really is and
ought to remain, but expressing that law so fully and clearly that
even busy lawyers and overworked judges may understand it at
a glance. The bill for such an act ought not to be constructed or
patched up on the floor of the House or the Senate or in a conference commitee, but should be drafted as Restatements of the Law
are drafted by the American Law Institute, and then be enacted in
that shape or not at all. 36
MARION EDWARDS.*
Note 33, supra.
Mr. W T. Stockton, of the Jacksonville (Fla.) Bar, in his excellent
article on this suject published in the AmERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION JOURNAL
for February 1929, intimated a hope that the present law (presumably
within a reasonable time) will come to be understood by the bench and
bar and state legislators, and expressed his belief that a new act would not
be advisable. The writer of the present article is an optimist, too, but
still doubts that the fog of misunderstanding will soon clear and logomachy
cease, unless an act of the kind above suggested be passed by Congress.
*State of Washington Bar. I should like to acknowledge here that my
son, William Winans Edwards, now studying at the University of Washington Law School, has given me much help and advice in the perparation
of this paper. Imperfections and errors, however, are my very own.-M. E.

